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Abstract 
Career concerns are escalated during the early years of a CEO’s tenure because the market is 
uncertainty about the new CEO’s ability and the compatibility between his or her skills and the 
firm’s strategic needs. This study examines whether such increased career concerns induce 
investment inefficiency during the early years of a CEO’s tenure. I find that underinvestment is 
more likely to happen in the early years than in the later years, and that the underinvestment 
problem is most evident when the CEO is externally appointed, holds an interim position, and has 
low managerial ability, and when the firm has a higher level of information asymmetry and lower 
financial reporting quality. I also find that firms are less likely to issue debts during those early 
years, which suggests that a reduced supply of capital can contribute to the underinvestment 
phenomenon in the early years of a CEO’s tenure. Together, these findings indicate that during the 
early years of a CEO’s service, especially in contexts where career concerns are high and the 
information environment is more asymmetric, investment inefficiency is more likely to occur.  
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How Do CEOs Make Investment Decisions in Their Early Years of Tenure? Evidence from 
Investment Efficiency 
1. Introduction 
Having a new CEO onboard significantly affects the management information environment 
of a firm and create uncertainty to some degree. First, the new CEO’s ability and how well his or 
her skills will fit the firm are uncertain to the top management team, the board of the directors, and 
the capital market (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bills et al., 
2017). Second, in the early years of a CEO’s tenure, career concerns arising from the CEO’s job 
security, subsequent job market competitiveness, future compensation, and managerial autonomy 
can affect his or her risk-taking preferences and the tendency to share information relevant to firm 
decision making with the board (Holmstrom, 1982). Such uncertainty and the changes to the 
management information environment can negatively affect firms’ capital allocation and 
investment decisions. This study investigates the firm’s investment efficiency in the few years 
following a new CEO’s appointment.  
The intensified career concerns in the early years of a CEO’s tenure are likely to cause the 
CEO to distort investment decision making process, leading to investment inefficiency.  For one 
thing, CEOs can act aggressively to impress the board of directors and inform the capital market 
about his or her capability as soon as possible (Prendergast and Stole 1996). Coles et al. (2006) 
also show shorter-tenured CEOs make more aggressive investments in research and development 
expenditure (R&D, hereafter) than longer-tenured CEOs. However, overinvestment may not 
necessarily occur because the board may exert stronger monitoring due to the uncertainty of the 
CEO’s ability during the first years of his/her tenure (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Dikolli, 
Mayew, and Nanda 2014). The interaction between the career concerns of the CEO and the board 
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will affect the information sharing between the board and the CEO and the project screening 
strength from the board. 
For another thing, new CEOs can be conservative when allocating resources and making 
investment decisions, because they are less familiar with a new firm’s operating environment, or 
they have been promoted to a position that demands different skills and information than the prior 
position (Holmstrom, 1982; Cadman et al., 2016). Holmstrom (1999) states that managers 
underinvest relative to the optimal level, because risky investment may reveal their true ability, 
which may compromise their future compensations. A more recent study, Chen and Zhang (2014), 
shows that as a CEO’s tenure gets longer, he/she becomes more risk-taking. With a risk-averse 
tendency during early years of tenure, CEOs can withhold project information and bypass 
investment opportunities that match firm-specific characteristics and fit the firms’ strategies, or 
exhibit herding behavior by ignoring their own private information about payoffs and copying the 
decisions of previous managers or other firms in the same industry (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). 
Such practices can lead to underinvestment. In addition, with the uncertainty about the ability of a 
new CEO during the first few years of tenure, the market may respond by rationing capital and 
reducing capital supply, restricting financial resources which could exaggerate underinvestment 
issues if the firm needs to raise funds to finance an existing positive net present value project 
(Myers and Majluf 1984).  
Using the data for the period 1992–2016 and following the method of Biddle et al. (2009), 
I find that underinvestment is more likely to happen during the early years (i.e., the first two years) 
than in the other years of a CEO’s tenure. I do not find evidence of overinvestment during the early 
years of a CEO’s tenure. A battery of robustness tests provides consistent support for the main 
finding of underinvestment during the early years of a CEO’s tenure. These tests include defining 
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“early years” as the first three years, using alternative measures to indicate firms’ likelihood of 
over- and underinvesting, examining specific types of investments (i.e., capital expenditures and 
non-capital expenditures that include R&D and acquisition expenditures), and controlling for the 
last years of a CEO’s tenure. 
I further conduct cross-sectional analyses to investigate whether the inefficiency in 
investments in the early years of a CEO’s tenure is more pronounced in certain contexts where 
career concerns and information asymmetry are more severe. Specifically, I examine how the 
degree of inefficiency varies with succession type (i.e., externally appointed versus internally 
promoted CEOs, permanent versus interim CEOs), the ability of the new CEOs, firms’ financial 
reporting quality, and firms’ information environment (i.e., high versus low information 
asymmetry).  
Externally appointed CEOs face a greater risk of termination and usually lack firm-specific 
knowledge during their early years with the firm (Harris and Helfat, 1997; Gillan et al., 2009). I 
find that underinvestment is more evident during the early years of externally hired CEOs but not 
internally promoted CEOs. Interim CEOs may have no incentives to make investments due to their 
temporary positions; however, for those who have promotion expectations, they tend to boost 
short-term performance to improve their promotion prospects (e.g., Ballinger and Marcel, 2010; 
Chen et al., 2015). I show that interim CEOs exhibit pronounced underinvestment during their 
early years of service. Higher ability CEOs generate more precise estimates of underlying 
profitability of the projects and respond to the economic environment more quickly than their less 
able counterparts. More able CEOs are also more confident about their own opinion and the project 
information they collect and share with the board (Prendergast and Stole 1996). Relative to more 
able CEOs, less able CEOs may ignore and withhold their own private information about payoffs 
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and copy the decisions of previous managers because they are more concerned about their career 
and reputation, which leads to investment inefficiency (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Jian and Lee, 
2011; Gan, 2019). I find that low-ability CEOs but not high-ability CEOs tend to underinvest 
during their early years of tenure. In addition, high information asymmetry can significantly 
increase monitoring costs and impede monitoring effectiveness; it can also negatively affect the 
flow of capital from external suppliers from external suppliers to the firms. As a result, investment 
inefficiency problem can be more pronounced if the information environment of the firm is highly 
asymmetric (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Lambert et al., 2007; Biddle et al., 2009; Garcia Lara et al., 2016). I find 
that the underinvestment phenomenon during the early years of CEO tenure is most pronounced 
in firms that have high information asymmetry and low financial information quality.   
Last but not least, additional analyses of firms’ likelihood of issuing equity and debt show 
that during the early years of a CEO’s tenure, firms are less likely to issue debt but not equity. The 
results also show that firms issue less debt during the early years of externally appointed CEOs, 
interim CEOs, and low-ability CEOs.  
This study makes the following contributions. First, it provides further insight into the 
investment pattern during a CEO’s tenure given various levels of career concerns and the 
characteristics of the information environment. Pan et al. (2016) document that disinvestment 
decreases over a CEO’s tenure while investment increases, and that investment quality deteriorates 
over a CEO’s tenure. They argue that this cyclical phenomenon is due to agency problems (i.e., 
the CEO gains more control over the board) and is widespread regardless of the type of CEO 
turnover, the new CEO’s succession origin, the CEO’s time in office, and the industry conditions 
at the time of turnover. My study takes a different angle by investigating investment efficiency 
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during the early years of a CEO’s tenure. Although Pan et al. (2016) show that investment increases 
over a CEO’s tenure, it is unknown whether the relatively low investment level in the early stage 
of CEO tenure is efficient or not, because firms operate in various settings prone to overinvestment 
or underinvestment. Such research question is critical because hiring a new CEO is a strategic 
move for most firms, and inefficient investment decisions in the early stage of a CEO’s tenure 
could prevent the firm from realizing its strategic goals and could impair firm growth and value in 
the long run. My study shows that underinvestment does exist during the early years of a CEO’s 
tenure, and its magnitude depends on the type of the new CEO, the ability of the new CEO, and 
the information environment of the firm. The findings of my study imply that boards of directors 
may want to pay attention to particular types of CEO succession and the information environment 
when they are in a situation to evaluate and make recommendations for investments. Boards might 
do well to provide varying levels of support and/or adjust monitoring strength to promote 
investment efficiency following CEO turnover, so that the firm can benefit from constant and long-
term growth.  
Second, this study extends the literature on myopic managerial behaviors following CEO 
turnovers. For example, Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), DeAngelo (1988), and 
Pourciau (1993) show that new CEOs overstate their firms’ expenses and losses in their first year 
of service (i.e., they take a big bath). Chen and Zhang (2014) find that CEOs’ risk-taking behavior 
is positively associated with their tenure. Ali and Zhang (2015) show that there is a greater 
propensity to overstate earnings in the early years than in the later years of CEOs’ service. My 
study adds evidence to this stream of literature by substantiating that underinvestment exists during 
the early years of a CEO’s tenure due to career concerns and information asymmetry.  
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Third, this study contributes to the research stream on how managerial attributes can 
influence firms’ investment practices. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Fee et al. (2013) document 
that variations in firms’ investment policies are significantly explained by manager fixed effects 
and managerial attributes. Denis and Denis (1995) find that capital expenditures and the number 
of employees decrease after forced CEO turnovers occur. Weisbach (1995) finds an unusually high 
likelihood of divesting poorly performing deals following CEO turnovers. Coles et al. (2006) show 
that as CEOs get longer tenure, they pursue stability in R&D investment. A recent study, Xie 
(2015), focuses on the firms in China and shows that newly appointed CEOs in Chinese firms tend 
to invest more efficiently, which supports the argument that new CEOs would like to make 
efficient investment decisions to build up their long-term reputation. My study extends this line of 
research by showing that new CEOs exhibit different levels of underinvestment in their early years 
of service, depending on the type of succession, the CEO’s ability, and the level of information 
asymmetry in the environment. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related 
literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3, I describe the research design. Section 4 
discusses the results, Section 5 provides additional analyses, and Section 6 presents robustness 
tests. I conclude our study in Section 7. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
2.1 Career concerns in the early years of CEO tenure 
According to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), managers experience career concerns when 
employers use their current performance to assess ability and set compensation. In this study, I 
focus on CEOs’ career concern in their early years of service and how it affects corporate 
investment efficiency. Career concern during the early years of CEO tenure can be severe, because 
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the market and creditors are still uncertain about and are assessing the CEO’s ability (Fama, 1980; 
Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Even for an internally promoted CEO, the 
market may still be uncertain about the CEO’s ability, as the skills required to be a successful CEO 
are different from the skills required in lower-level positions (Gibbons and Murphy 1992). The 
market’s perception and recognition of a new CEO’s ability is critical to the CEO because it will 
affect the CEO’s job security, subsequent job market competitiveness, future compensation, and 
managerial autonomy (e.g., Fama, 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Consistent with this 
view, Ali and Zhang (2015) and Cadman et al. (2016) conjecture that CEOs with less tenure are in 
a more uncertain position with the firm and therefore face a higher risk of dismissal. Due to such 
career concerns, CEOs with less tenure tend to make prudent managerial decisions, and they work 
hard to perform well and establish their reputations in the market (Holmstrom, 1982). 
The career concerns discussed above create pressure and lead to myopic managerial 
behavior. For instance, existing studies provide empirical evidence that new CEOs overstate their 
firms’ expenses and losses in their first year of service, attributing them to the previous CEOs so 
that they can take credit for higher earnings in subsequent years (e.g., Strong and Meyer, 1987; 
Elliott and Shaw, 1988; DeAngelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993). Ali and Zhang (2015) show that there 
is a greater propensity to overstate earnings in the early years than in the later years of CEOs’ 
service, consistent with the conjecture that new CEOs aim to inform the market about their ability 
in their early years of service when the market is more uncertain (Ali and Zhang, 2015). Supporting 
Ali and Zhang’s (2015) findings, Bills et al. (2017) report that audit fees are higher in the early 
years of a CEO’s service, because the perceived risk of financial reporting violations is higher in 
those years due to market’s uncertainty about firms’ future operations and financial policies, as 
well as the potential motivation for earnings management introduced by management succession. 
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Career concerns also have consequences to the quality of management forecast. For example, Pae, 
Song, and Yi (2016) find that short-tenured CEOs are more likely to issue downward earnings 
guidance when they have bad news. 
Regarding investment patterns in the early years of CEOs’ service, Weisbach (1995) shows 
that at the time of a CEO change, firms are more likely to divest an acquisition at a loss or divest 
an acquisition considered unprofitable by the press. Du and Lin (2011) find that new CEOs with 
high options-based compensation, CEOs who are hired after a forced turnover, and CEOs with 
shorter organization tenure are associated with high R&D and advertisement investments. Cadman 
et al. (2016) show evidence that having ex ante severance pay contracts can mitigate CEOs’ 
propensity to be risk averse during their early years of service and provide them with insurance for 
their human capital and incentives to invest in risky positive-NPV projects. Finally, Pan et al. 
(2016) document a pattern of increasing investments over the CEO cycle, although the authors do 
not claim to know whether or not the investments are efficient. Xie (2015) shows that newly 
appointed CEOs tend to invest efficiently in Chinese firms by documenting an enhanced effect 
brought by newly appointed CEOs to the positive association between Tobin’s Q and investment 
levels, consistent with a long-term career concerns perspective that newly appointed CEOs want 
to build up their reputation in the long run. 
2.2 Hypothesis development  
According to the neoclassical framework, firms invest until the marginal benefit of capital 
investment equals the marginal costs, and managers obtain financing for positive net present value 
projects at the prevailing economy-wide interest rate and return the extra cash to investors (e.g., 
Yoshikawa, 1980; Abel, 1983). In settings where investment opportunities are being considered 
and decisions are being made, the CEO is responsible for generating project ideas and identify 
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investment opportunities. In this process, the CEO controls the information available to the board 
and the board exerts its advisory function by evaluating the potential investment opportunities 
(Adams and Ferreira 2006; Song and Thakor 2006). The precision of the information shared by 
the CEO to the board affects the board’s project choice recommendations and thus investment 
efficiency of the firm (Song and Thakor 2006). 
As discussed above, CEOs face intense career concerns during the early years of their 
tenure, as their ability is still unknown by the market and investors (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1982; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). Firm performance and investment decisions becomes critical to 
convey information about CEO ability to the board and the market (Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda 
2014). The market updates its perception on the CEO’s managerial ability based on investment 
decisions they make (Prendergast and Stole 1996). I argue that in the early years of a CEO’s tenure, 
the career concerns are likely to cause the CEO to distort investment decision making process, 
leading to investment inefficiency consequences.   
On the one hand, CEOs can be motivated to prove their abilities and take on more 
investments early in their tenure. Prendergast and Stole (1996) state that new CEOs are likely to 
distort the project information conveyed to the board by exaggerating their own opinions to show 
they discover investment ideas of their own. Coles et al. (2006) show that compared to shorter-
tenured CEOs, CEOs with longer tenure pursue more stable investment strategy in R&D. These 
prior studies imply that CEOs can act aggressively in investments in the early years of their tenure 
so that the market can recognize their abilities quickly, because risk-taking and making investment 
would signal to the market that a manager is talented. In other words, under the pressure of 
informing the market about their abilities, CEOs in early tenure have incentives to overinvest. 
Nevertheless, they may not be able to succeed in pursuing overinvestment due to the monitoring 
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from the board. Compared to that of longer-serving CEOs, the ability of shorter-tenure CEOs is 
more uncertain, creating a higher demand for monitoring from the board (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1998). Consistent with this view, Dikolli, Mayew, and Nanda (2014) shows that the CEO-turnover 
sensitivity to firm performance declines over a CEO’s tenure, which suggests stronger monitoring 
in early years than late years of CEO tenure. Furthermore, Song and Thakor (2006) demonstrate 
that both the CEO and the board have career concerns that interact, and such interaction affects the 
information sharing between the board and the CEO. Consequently, the project ideas and project 
information generated and provided by CEOs, especially those in their early tenure, are expected 
to be screened and seriously evaluated by the board of directors. Facing more intense monitoring, 
CEOs in early tenure might not be able to make aggressive investment even though their career 
concerns motivate them to do so. 
On the other hand, new CEOs can be conservative and reluctant to make investment 
decisions, because they are less familiar with a new firm’s operating environment, or they have 
been promoted to a position that demands different skills and information than the prior position. 
As it is critical in the early years to establish their reputations and favorably influence the market’s 
perception of their abilities (e.g., Fama, 1980; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), they are likely to 
act in a prudent manner when allocating resources and making investment decisions (Holmstrom, 
1982; Cadman et al., 2016). Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) argue that career concerns may 
incentivize managers to favor safe projects in an attempt to delay the resolution of the uncertainty 
about their ability. In a similar vein, Holmstrom (1999) states that managers underinvest relative 
to the optimal level, because risky investment may reveal their true ability, which may compromise 
their future compensations. A more recent study, Chen and Zhang (2014), show that as a CEO’s 
tenure gets longer, he/she becomes more risk-taking. With a risk-averse tendency during early 
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years of tenure, CEOs can withhold project information and bypass investment opportunities that 
match firm-specific characteristics and fit the firms’ strategies, or exhibit herding behavior by 
ignoring their own private information about payoffs and copying the decisions of previous 
managers or other firms in the same industry (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Such practices are 
detrimental to corporate investment efficiency and lead to underinvestment. Furthermore, with the 
uncertainty about the ability of a new CEO and whether his or her skills will fit the firm’s 
characteristics and eventually benefit its future operations during the first few years of tenure,  the 
market may respond by rationing capital and reducing capital supply, which constrains financial 
resources and leads to ex post underinvestment if the firm needs to raise funds to finance an 
existing positive net present value project (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
Summing up the above discussion, I form the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis: There is investment inefficiency during the early years of CEO tenure. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample and data 
The sample period of this study is from 1992 to 2016. I collect firms’ financial data from 
the Compustat database and CEO characteristics from the Execucomp database. Corporate 
governance data are from the RiskMetrics database. I delete observations with missing values in 
the required variables and exclude firms in the financial services industries (with SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999), which leaves a final sample of 21,012 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Empirical model 
The hypothesis predicts that underinvestment exists during the early years of a CEO’s 
tenure. Following Biddle et al. (2009), I estimate the following Model (1) to test the association 
between the early years of CEO tenure and investment efficiency. I employ a lagged model because 
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firms generally prepare investment budgets ahead of a new fiscal year. I control for both industry 
and year fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity across industries and years in Model 
(1). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
INVT_TOTi,t+1 = β0 + β1EARLY_YEARSi,t +β2 EARLY_YEARSi,t* OVERIi,t + β3 OVERIi,t + β4 
SIZEi,t + β5 MTOBi,t + β6 LOSSi,t + β7 SALE_VOLi,t + β8 INVT_VOLi,t + β9 CFO_SALEi,t + β10 
CFO_VOLi,t + β11 SLACKi,t + β12 DIVi,t + β13 ZSCOREi,t + β14 TANGIBILITYi,t + β15 
IND_STRUCTUREi,t + β16 AQi,t + β17 EINDEXi,t + β18 CEOAGEi,t + ei,t+1,                                 (1) 
         
where 
INVT_TOT = the level of total investments, equal to the sum of capital expenditures, R&D, 
and acquisition expenditures less cash receipts from the sale of property, plant, and equipment 
(PPE) scaled by lagged total assets, multiplied by 100; 
EARLY_YEARS = one if it is one of the first two years of a CEO’s service at a firm, and 
zero otherwise;  
OVERI = a composite score measure created to indicate the likelihood of over- and under-
investment based on the ranking of cash and leverage levels; 
SIZE = natural log of total assets;  
MTOB = the ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets;  
LOSS = an indicator variable equal to one if net income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise;  
SALE_VOL = standard deviation of sales, scaled by average total assets over the previous 
five years;  
INVT_VOL = the standard deviation of total investments over the previous five years;  
CFO_SALE = operating cash flows divided by sales;  
CFO_VOL = standard deviation of the cash flow from operations, scaled by the average 
total assets over the previous five years;  
SLACK = the ratio of cash to PPE;  
DIV = an indicator variable equal to one if the firm paid dividends, and zero otherwise;  
ZSCORE = 0.033*earnings before extraordinary items/total assets + sales/total assets + 
0.014*retained earnings/total assets + 0.012*(working capital/total assets) + 0.006*(market value 
of common stock/total liabilities);  
TANGIBILITY = PPE divided by total assets;  
IND_KSTRUCTURE = the mean of capital structure, long-term debt divided by the sum 
of long-term debt and the market value of equity, for firms in the same SIC 3-digit industry; 
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AQ = standard deviations (volatilities) of abnormal discretionary accruals times negative 
one; the abnormal discretionary accruals were estimated using the modified Jones model;  
EINDEX = the entrenchment index constructed according to Bebchuk et al. (2009); and  
CEOAGE = the age of the CEO.  
 
Following Biddle et al. (2009), the model scheme relies on the underlying theory that the 
level of free cash flow and leverage together indicate the severity of agency problems, which may 
lead to overinvestment or underinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Specifically, 
I construct a rank variable, OVERI, to indicate a firm’ tendency towards overinvestment or 
underinvestment. Firms are ranked into deciles according to their cash and leverage levels; 
leverage is multiplied by -1 before ranking, so that it can be interpreted in the same direction as 
cash balance. Deciles constructed in this way are re-scaled to range from 0 to 1; a composite score 
measure (OVERI) is then constructed equaling the mean of the ranked values of the two 
partitioning variables. The OVERI variable is decreasing with the trend of underinvestment. In 
Model (1), β1 indicates investment levels during the early years of a CEO’s tenure when 
underinvestment is most likely, i.e., when OVERI is 0. If underinvestment is more severe and 
significant during CEOs’ early years of service than during later years, I expect to observe a 
negative β1.  
The variable of interest is EARLY_YEARS, which equals one if the year is the first or 
second year of a CEO’s tenure with a firm, and zero otherwise.  
Following Biddle et al. (2009), Cheng et al. (2013), and Garcia Lara et al. (2016), I include 
a series of control variables in the model, such as firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MTOB), 
loss (LOSS), sales volatility (SALE_VOL), investment volatility (INVT_VOL), cash flow to sales 
ratio (CFO_SALE), cash flow volatility (CFO_VOL), cash to PPE ratio (SLACK), dividend 
(DIV), the possibility of bankruptcy measured as in Altman (1968) (ZSCORE), the ratio of PPE 
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to total assets (TANGIBILITY), and the industry mean of capital structure (IND_STRUCTURE). 
Sales volatility and loss indicate firm performance and profitability; firm size and market-to-book 
ratio represent growth opportunities; cash flow to sales ratio, cash flow volatility, and cash to PPE 
ratio suggest free cash availability; dividends and the possibility of bankruptcy suggest the degree 
of financial constraint. In addition, I control for accruals quality (AQ) and the degree of 
management entrenchment (EINDEX), because Biddle et al. (2009) reveal that financial reporting 
quality and corporate governance can affect investment efficiency. Finally, I control for CEOs’ 
age (CEOAGE), as age can be related to a CEO’s risk-taking perspective, which in turns affects 
investment decision-making.       
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations among variables. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles in each year to minimize the effects of 
outliers.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In Panel A of Table 1, the mean (median) of total investments, INVT_TOT, is 12.338 
percent (4.996 percent) of the previous year’s total assets. The mean of EARLY_YEARS is 0.294, 
indicating that about 29.4 percent of the firm-year observations are from the first two years of a 
CEO’s tenure. The average OVERI is 0.547. The average firm size is 7.696, and the market-to-
book ratio has a mean of 1.955. The sample has an average sales volatility of 0.138 and a mean 
operating cash flow volatility of 0.044. 14.6 percent of the firm-year observations report losses. 
The average volatility of total investments is 0.044. The ratio of operating cash flow to sales has a 
mean of 0.129 and a median of 0.061. The ratio of cash to PPE, SLACK, has a mean of 1.312, and 
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the Z-score to indicate bankruptcy risk has an average of 1.122. Finally, the ratio of PPE to total 
assets, TANGIBILITY, has a mean of 0.313, the average negative standard deviation of abnormal 
accruals (AQ) is -1.379, and EINDEX has a mean of 2.977 and a median of 2.000. 
In Panel B of Table 1, investment level is negatively related to early years of CEO tenure, 
which is consistent with the findings in Pan et al. (2016). In addition, OVERI, market-to-book 
ratio, investment volatilities, cash flow volatilities, and cash flow to sales ratio are positively 
related to investment levels, while firm size, loss, dividend distribution, likelihood of bankruptcy 
proxied by ZSCORE, capital structure, volatility of abnormal discretionary accruals, entrenchment 
index, and CEO age are negatively associated with investment levels.  
4.2 The association between the early years of CEO tenure and investment efficiency 
 The main hypothesis predicts that during the early years of CEO tenure, underinvestment 
will be more severe and significant. The results of testing this hypothesis with Model (1) are 
reported in Column (1) of Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 As Column (1) of Table 2 shows, EARLY_YEARS is significantly and negatively 
associated with the levels of total investments (t = -2.42, p <0.05). This suggests that 
underinvestment is more likely to happen in the early years in of a CEO’s tenure than in the later 
years. This effect is economically significant: Compared to non-early years (when 
EARLY_YEARS equals zero), early years (when EARLY_YEARS equals one) are associated 
with a decrease of 1.066 in total investments when firms are prone to underinvest. Because the 
mean value of total capital investments (deflated by the previous year’s total assets) is 12.338, this 
reflects a decrease of 8.4 percent. I do not find that CEOs tend to overinvest during their early 
years of service: The coefficient estimate for the interaction between EARLY_YEARS and 
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OVERI is insignificant. Overall, the evidence shows that CEOs tend to underinvest in the early 
years of their tenure, which supports the hypothesis that investment inefficiency during the early 
years of CEOs’ tenure. In the next section, I examine whether the investment inefficiency becomes 
more or less pronounced in certain contexts by conducting cross-sectional analyses.  
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses of the association between the early years of CEO tenure and 
investment inefficiency  
 I conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to investigate whether the association between 
the early years of CEO tenure and investment inefficiency is stronger or weaker when 1) the CEO 
is externally appointed versus internally promoted, 2) the CEO holds a permanent position versus 
an interim position, 3) the CEO has higher- versus lower-than-average managerial abilities, and 4) 
the information asymmetry at the firm level is high versus low.  
 Externally appointed CEOs face a greater risk of termination; therefore, they have higher 
career concerns (Gillan et al., 2009). Furthermore, externally appointed CEOs are more likely than 
internally appointed CEOs to lack firm-specific and even industry-specific knowledge, especially 
during their early years with the firm (Harris and Helfat, 1997). As a result, externally appointed 
CEOs typically require greater monitoring diligence from the board (Huson et al., 2001; Hermalin, 
2005; Jongjaroenkamol and Laux, 2017). I identify a CEO as internally promoted if he or she was 
in the top management team for two years before becoming the CEO, and externally hired 
otherwise. In order to test whether the association between the early years of CEO tenure and 
underinvestment differs between externally hired and internally promoted CEOs, I create two 
dummy variables, EARLY_EXTERNAL and EARLY_INTERNAL. EARLY_EXTERNAL 
equals one if the observation is from one of the early years of a CEO’s tenure and the CEO is 
externally appointed, and zero otherwise; EARLY_INTERNAL equals one if the observation is 
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from one of the early years of a CEO’s tenure and the CEO is internally promoted, and zero 
otherwise. I add these two dummy variables and their respective interactions with OVERI in Model 
(1) and report the results of testing this modified Model (1) in Column (2) of Table 2.  
 Focusing on Column (2) of Table 2, I find a significant and negative efficiency for 
EARLY_EXTERNAL (t = -2.28, p < 0.05), while the coefficient estimate for 
EARLY_INTERNAL is not significant. This evidence suggests that externally hired CEOs are 
more likely than internally promoted CEOs to underinvest during their early years of service. In 
addition, I find a positive and significant coefficient for EARLY_EXTERNAL*OVERI, which 
indicates a significant incremental increase in investment levels during the early years of an 
externally hired CEO’s tenure as overinvestment becomes more likely. A joint significance test 
for EARLY_EXTERNAL+EARLY_EXTERNAL*OVERI does not yield significant results 
(untabulated), suggesting that there is no significant evidence for overinvestment during the early 
years of externally appointed CEOs’ tenure.  
 Next, I investigate whether the CEO occupies a permanent or an interim position matters 
in the magnitude of investment inefficiency during the first few years. Permanent CEOs and 
interim CEOs can display different patterns of investment decision-making in their early years of 
service because these two groups have varying incentives and performance (e.g., Ballinger and 
Marcel, 2010; Chen et al., 2015). For example, Ballinger and Marcel (2010) show that interim 
CEOs are associated with lower performance during the period in which the interim serves. Chen 
et al. (2015) find that interim CEOs are more likely than permanent CEOs to engage in earnings 
management to increase firm earnings in order to improve their promotion prospects. Due to the 
temporary nature of their position, interim CEOs are likely to underinvest; however, if they have 
incentives to become a permanent CEO, they can be motivated to make aggressive investment 
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decisions to signal their ability and force the market to rely more on the prior estimate of their 
ability (Hermalin 1993). I utilize the Director and Officer Changes dataset in the AuditAnalytics 
database to identify whether a CEO succession type is interim or permanent when a turnover event 
occurs. In a procedure similar to the one described above, I create two dummy variables: 
EARLY_PERMANENT and EARLY_ INTERIM. EARLY_ PERMANENT equals one if the 
observation is from one of the early years of a CEO’s tenure and the CEO is appointed or promoted 
as a permanent CEO, and zero otherwise; EARLY_ INTERIM equals one if the observation is 
from one of the early years of a CEO’s tenure and the CEO occupies an interim position, and zero 
otherwise. I add these two dummy variables and their respective interactions with OVERI to Model 
(1) and report the results of testing this modified Model (1) in Column (3) of Table 2. The results 
show that interim CEOs exhibit pronounced underinvestment during their early years of service 
(i.e., the coefficient for EARLY_INTERIM is significant and negative), but permanent CEOs do 
not.  
 Next, I examine whether CEOs with varying levels of managerial ability display different 
investment efficiency in their early years of tenure. Higher-ability CEOs have better knowledge 
and judgment than their peers and are better able anticipate future changes (Trueman, 1986). They 
generate more precise estimates of underlying profitability of the projects and respond to the 
economic environment more quickly than their less able counterparts (Prendergast and Stole 
1996). More importantly, more able CEOs are more confident about their own opinion and the 
project information they collect and share with the board (Prendergast and Stole 1996). In contrast, 
less able CEOs may ignore their own private information about payoffs and copy the decisions of 
previous managers because of their greater career and reputation concerns, which leads to 
investment inefficiency (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). Consistent with this conjecture, Jian and 
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Lee (2011) provide empirical evidence that investment decisions made by more reputable CEOs 
lead to better post-investment performance. Gan (2019) shows that more able CEOs make more 
efficient investment decisions. I adopt the managerial ability measures developed by Demerjian et 
al. (2012) and divide the sample into an above-median group (HIGHABILITY) and a below-
median group (LOWABILITY). I then create two dummy variables, EARLY_HIGHABILITY and 
EARLY_LOWABILITY, and add these two dummy variables and their respective interactions 
with OVERI to Model (1). The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 2. They show that the 
low-ability CEOs, but not the high-ability CEOs, tend to underinvest during their early years of 
tenure (t = -2.32, p < 0.05). 
 Finally, I investigate how the information environment of the firm affects the propensity 
of investment inefficiency during the early years of CEO tenure. Prior studies (e.g., Bushman and 
Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Lambert et al., 2007; Biddle et al., 
2009) substantiate that high financial reporting quality can improve investment efficiency by 
reducing information asymmetry between firms and external suppliers of capital and by enhancing 
monitoring effectiveness. Garcia Lara et al. (2016) find that the effects of accounting on mitigating 
firms’ underinvestment are more pronounced in firms characterized by greater information 
asymmetry. This line of literature suggests that the investment inefficiency phenomenon during 
the early years of CEO tenure can be exaggerated by a high level of information asymmetry in the 
firm. I use three variables to capture firms’ information environment: 1) information quality, 
measured as the standard deviation of abnormal discretionary accruals (estimated using the 
modified Jones model) over the past five years; 2) information asymmetry, computed as the 
average of the standardized values of the bid-ask spread, volatility, and idiosyncratic risk; and 3) 
credit rating, an indicator variable that equals one if the firm does not have a credit rating in 
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Compustat, and zero otherwise. I then create dummy variables to indicate early years and high/low 
information quality (EARLY_YEARS_HIGHAQ/EARLY_YEARS_LOWAQ), early years and 
high/low information asymmetry (EARLY_YEARS_HIGHIA/EARLY_YEARS_LOWIA), and 
early years and credit rating/no credit rating (EARLY_YEARS_CR/EARLY_YEARS_NCR). I 
incorporate these variables and their respective interactions with OVERI into Model (1). The 
results are tabulated in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Column (1) of Table 3 shows a marginally significant coefficient (t = -1.79, p < 0.1) for 
EARLY_YEARS_LOWAQ, suggesting that the association between underinvestment and early 
years of CEO tenure is pronounced for firms with low information quality. Column (2) reveals that 
an environment with high information asymmetry exacerbates underinvestment during CEOs’ 
early years of tenure (the coefficient for EARLY_YEARS_HIGHIA is significant and negative at 
p <0.01). Finally, Column (3) reports that underinvestment in CEOs’ early years is most evident 
for firms without a credit rating (t = -2.53, p < 0.05). Taken together, the results in Table 3 show 
that the investment inefficiency problem, i.e., underinvestment, during the early years of CEO 
tenure is most pronounced in firms that have low information quality and high information 
asymmetry.  
5. Additional analyses  
 As discussed earlier, when a CEO is newly promoted or appointed, there is high uncertainty 
about the new CEO’s ability (Fama ,1980; Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998) and 
whether his or her skills will fit the firm’s characteristics and eventually benefit its future 
operations (Bills et al., 2017). The market can respond to such uncertainty by reducing capital 
supply, which constrains financial resources and leads to ex post underinvestment if the firm needs 
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to raise funds to finance an existing positive net present value project (Myers and Majluf 1984). If 
this is the case, a decrease in debt and equity issuance is expected during the early years of CEO 
tenure. Two variables, FUTURE_DEBT_ISSUANCE and FUTURE_EQUITY_ISSUANCE, are 
constructed to indicate whether firms issue debt and equity. Specifically, 
FUTURE_DEBT_ISSUANCE is debt issuance in year t+1, where debt issuance equals long-term 
debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus current debt changes; 
FUTURE_EQUITY_ISSUANCE is equity issuance in year t+1, where equity issuance equals sale 
of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common and preferred stock. Both debt 
issuance and equity issuance are scaled by sales. I then replace the dependent variable in Model 
(1) with these two variables. In addition to the existing control variables in Model (1), I also control 
for credit rating and information asymmetry, computed as the average of the standardized values 
of the bid-ask spread, volatility, and idiosyncratic risk, to account for the potential effects of 
information environment on firms’ likelihood of issuing debt and/or equity (Garcia Lara et al. 
2016). In addition to investigating the debt and equity issuance patterns during the early years of 
CEO tenure, I also look at specific contexts including externally appointed versus internally 
promoted CEOs, permanent versus interim CEOs, and high-ability versus low-ability CEOs. The 
results are tabulated in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A in Table 4 report the results of testing Model (1). They 
show that overall, the early years of CEO tenure are associated with less debt issuance (t =t -2.46, 
p < 0.05) but not less equity issuance. Columns (3) and (4) look at externally hired versus internally 
promoted CEOs and show that externally hired, but not internally promoted, CEOs issue less debt 
during their early years (t = -2.51, p < 0.05); no significant evidence is found for equity issuance. 
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Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B in Table 4 reveal that the early years of interim CEOs are associated 
with less debt issuance (t = -1.95, p < 0.1); no significant evidence is found for equity issuance. 
Finally, Column (3) of Panel B in Table 4 shows that the early years of low-ability CEOs’ tenure 
display less debt issuance (t = -1.92, p < 0.1). In addition, Column (4) shows that high-ability 
CEOs tend to issue more equity during their early years (t = 2.49, p < 0.05) when the firm is prone 
to underinvest; as firms’ likelihood of overinvestment increases, CEOs’ early years are associated 
with decreased issuance of equity (t = -3.09, p < 0.01).  
6. Robustness tests 
 I conduct a battery of robustness tests to provide additional support for the main findings. 
First, I adopt alternative measures of the independent variable of interest by defining the first three 
years of a CEO’s tenure in a firm as the early years and find consistent results (not tabulated). 
Second, I conduct the analyses based on specific types of investments (e.g., capital expenditures 
and non-capital expenditures that include R&D and acquisition expenditures), and I find that CEOs 
tend to significantly underinvest in both capital expenditures (t = -2.67, p < 0.01) and non-capital 
expenditures (t = -1.77, p < 0.1). The results are reported in Panel A of Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Third, I employ two alternative OVERI measures, OVERINDUSTRY and 
OVERAGGREGATE as in Biddle et al. (2009), to conduct sensitivity analyses. Following Biddle 
et al. (2009), I aggregate investment at the industry and economy levels and use these measures to 
proxy for firms’ likelihood of over- and underinvestment. To construct OVERINDUSTRY, I 
estimate an investment model at the industry level by regressing average investment and average 
sales growth for all industries with at least 20 observations in a given year based on the Fama and 
French (1997) 48-industry classification for each year. I then rank the residuals from these 
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estimations into deciles (re-scaled from zero to one) and construct the aggregate industry-year 
variable, OVERINDUSTRY, to indicate the tendency to over- and underinvest. Similarly, I regress 
average investment and average sales growth in the overall economy in each of the sample years 
and rank the residuals into deciles (re-scaled from zero to one) to construct the aggregate economy-
year variable, OVERAGGREGATE. I then replace the OVERI variable in Model (1) with the two 
variables and re-test the main model. Results are tabulated in Panel B of Table 5. I consistently 
find significant underinvestment during the early years of a CEO’s service using the industry-year 
aggregated measure, OVERINDUSTRY, and the economy-year aggregated measure, 
OVERAGGREEGATE, with a significant and negative coefficient (t = -1.99, p < 0.05) for 
EARLY_YEARS in Column (1) and a marginally significant and negative coefficient (t = -1.80, 
p < 0.1) for EARLY_YEARS in Column (2).  
 Finally, as prior studies find that CEOs in their last years have incentives to reduce 
discretionary expenditures, such as R&D and advertising, to boost accounting earnings and 
bonuses (e.g., Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Cheng, 2004; Kalyta, 
2009), I control for a variable indicating the last two years of a CEO’s service in Model (1). The 
results, which are tabulated in Panel C of Table 5, show that CEOs underinvest during their early 
years of service. They also show that CEOs tend to underinvest during their last years of service, 
consistent with the findings in prior studies.   
7. Conclusions 
Existing studies, such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Fee et al. (2013), substantiate 
that manager fixed effects and managerial attributes significantly explain firms’ variations in 
investment practices and policies. Meanwhile, Biddle and Hilary (2006), Biddle et al. (2009), and 
Garcia Lara et al. (2016) show that the information environment has nontrivial impacts on firms’ 
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investment efficiency. In this study, I examine firms’ investment efficiency during the early years 
of a CEO’s tenure, when the management information environment can be significantly changed, 
and the new CEO’s risk appetite, personal incentives, and career concerns are gradually emerging 
and affecting his or her investment decisions following the CEO turnover event. Using data from 
1992 to 2016, I find that underinvestment is more likely during the early years (i.e., the first two 
years) than during the other years of a CEO’s tenure. I find no evidence for overinvestment during 
the early years of a CEO’s tenure.  
I further show that the propensity to underinvest varies with the degree of the new CEO’s 
career concerns and the information asymmetry and information quality of the firm’s environment. 
Specifically, I find that underinvestment is most evident during the early years of the tenure of 
externally hired CEOs, of interim CEOs, and of low-ability CEOs. I also find that underinvestment 
during the early years of CEO tenure is most pronounced in firms that have high information 
asymmetry and low financial information quality. This body of evidence suggests that the new 
CEO’s career concerns in the early years of a CEO’s tenure are the underlying factors that 
contribute to the underinvestment phenomenon, and increased information asymmetry at firm level 
can intensify this issue. 
This study extends the literature on myopic managerial behavior following CEO turnovers 
(e.g., Strong and Meyer, 1987; Elliott and Shaw, 1988; DeAngelo, 1988; Pourciau, 1993; Ali and 
Zhang, 2015). It does so by documenting evidence of the prevalence of underinvestment during 
the early years of a CEO’s tenure, and showing that the degree of investment inefficiency depends 
on the type of succession, the CEO’s ability, and the degree of the firm’s information asymmetry. 
These findings also contribute to the research stream on how managerial attributes can influence 
firms’ investment practices (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Fee et al., 2013; Denis and Denis, 
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1995). Finally, this study has significant implications for the firm’s monitoring body, the board of 
directors and shareholders. Once they are aware of the underinvestment phenomenon, they might 
choose to provide special attention, stronger monitoring, and increased levels of support. By 
considering succession type, CEO characteristics, and the nature of the firm’s information 
environment, they will be better positioned to help the CEO enhance the firm’s growth, 
competitiveness, and long-term value.  
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Appendix A 
Variable Definitions  
 
Variables Definitions 
AQ Standard deviations of abnormal discretionary accruals 
estimated by the modified Jones Model, multiplied by 
negative 1 
 CAPX The level of capital expenditures scaled by lagged total 
assets, multiplied by 100 
CFO_SALE Operating cash flows divided by sales 
 CFO_VOL Standard deviation of the cash flow from operations 
deflated by average total assets over previous 5 years 
CEOAGE The age of CEO 
CR Take the value of 1 if the firm has crediting rating in 
Compustat, and 0 otherwise 
DIV A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends, and 
0 otherwise 
EINDEX The entrenchment index constructed according to Bebchuk 
et al. (2009). 
EARLY_YEARS The first or second year of a CEO’s tenure 
EXTERNAL Take the value of 1 if the CEO is hired from outside, and 0 
otherwise 
HIGHAQ Take the value of 1 if the firm’s accounting quality (AQ) is 
above median, and 0 otherwise  
HIGHABILITY Take the value of 1 if the CEO’s ability score as measured 
in Dermerjian et al. (2012) is above median, and 0 
otherwise 
HIGHIA Take the value of 1 if the firm’s information asymmetry 
(IA) is above median, and 0 otherwise 
IA Information asymmetry, measured as the average of the 
standardized values of the bid–ask spread, volatility, 
and idiosyncratic risk following Garcia Lara et al. 
(2016) 
INVT_TOT The level of total investment, measured as the capital 
expenditures + R&D + acquisition expenditures - cash 
receipts from sale of property, plant, and equipment, scaled 
by lagged total assets, multiplied by 100 
INVT_VOL The standard deviation of total investments over previous 
five years 
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INTERNAL Take the value of 1 if the CEO is promoted internally and 0 
otherwise 
INTERIM Take the value of 1 if the CEO is an interim CEO, and 0 
otherwise 
IND_STRUCTURE Mean of K-structure, measured as long-term debt divided by 
the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity, 
for firms in the same SIC3-digit industry 
LOSS A dummy variable equal to 1 if net income before 
extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
LOWAQ Take the value of 1 if the firm’s accounting quality (AQ) is 
below median, and 0 otherwise 
LOWABILITY Take the value of 1 if the CEO’s ability score as measured 
in Dermerjian et al. (2012) is below median, and 0 
otherwise 
LOWIA Take the value of 1 if the firm’s information asymmetry 
(IA) is below median, and 0 otherwise 
MTOB The ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of 
total assets 
NCR Take the value of 1 if the firm has no crediting rating in 
Compustat, and 0 otherwise 
NON_CAPX The level of R&D expenditures and acquisition 
expenditures scaled by lagged total assets, multiplied by 100 
OVERI A composite score measure created to indicate the 
likelihood of over-investment and under-investment based 
on the ranking of cash and leverage levels 
OVERINDUSTRY Regress average investment on average sales growth 
for all industries with at least 20 observations in a 
given year based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-
industry classification for each year, then rank the 
residuals from these estimations into deciles (re-scaled 
from zero to one) to indicate the tendency of over- and 
underinvestment 
OVERAGGREGATE Regress average investment and average sales growth 
in the overall economy in each of the sample years, 
then rank the residuals into deciles (re-scaled from zero 
to one) to indicate the tendency of over- and 
underinvestment 
PERMANENT  Take the value of 1 if the CEO is a permanent CEO, and 0 
otherwise 
 SALE_VOL Standard deviation of the sales deflated by average total 
assets over previous 5 years 
SIZE Natural log of total assets 
SLACK The ratio of cash to PPE 
TANGIBILITY PPE divided by total assets 
ZSCORE 0.033*earnings before extraordinary item/total assets + 
sales/total assets + 0.014*retained earnings/total assets + 
0.012*(working capital/total assets) + 0.006*(market value 
of common stock/total liabilities) 
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 Table 1  
Panel A: Descript Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD P10 P25 Median P75 P90 
INVT_TOT 21012 12.338 12.067 0.567 2.683 4.996 8.846 15.334 
EARLY_YEARS 21012 0.294 0.456 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OVERI 21012 0.547 0.245 0.150 0.250 0.350 0.500 0.750 
SIZE 21012 7.696 1.490 4.834 5.832 6.590 7.566 8.675 
MTOB 21012 1.955 1.189 0.813 1.049 1.223 1.579 2.237 
LOSS 21012 0.146 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SALE_VOL 21012 0.138 0.125 0.012 0.032 0.056 0.100 0.174 
INVT_VOL 21012 0.059 0.057 0.003 0.010 0.020 0.040 0.077 
CFO_SALE 21012 0.129 0.119 -0.134 0.022 0.061 0.109 0.180 
CFO_VOL 21012 0.044 0.034 0.006 0.013 0.021 0.034 0.056 
SLACK 21012 1.312 2.749 0.001 0.015 0.059 0.284 1.183 
DIV 21012 0.639 0.480 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ZSCORE 21012 1.122 0.700 0.213 0.394 0.631 0.971 1.414 
TANGIBILITY 21012 0.313 0.233 0.023 0.063 0.125 0.243 0.463 
IND_STRUCTURE 21012 0.190 0.128 0.004 0.064 0.087 0.154 0.265 
AQ 21012 -1.379 4.778 -26.693 -2.571 -0.696 -0.151 -0.050 
EINDEX 21012 2.977 1.489 0.000 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 
CEOAGE 21012 56.103 7.194 40.000 47.000 51.000 56.000 61.000 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
* indicates significance level at least <0.1 
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Table 2 
Early years of CEO tenure and investment efficiency   
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 INVT_TOT INVT_TOT INVT_TOT INVT_TOT 
      
EARLY_YEARS -1.066**    
 (-2.42)    
EARLY_YEARS*OVERI 0.997    
 (1.16)    
EARLY_EXTERNAL  -2.631**   
  (-2.28)   
OVERI*EARLY_EXTERNAL 4.837**   
  (2.40)   
EARLY_INTERNAL  -0.572   
  (-1.10)   
OVERI*EARLY_INTERNAL -0.199   
  (-0.19)   
EARLY_PERMANENT    0.706  
   (0.77)  
OVERI*EARLY_PERMANENT   -0.868  
   (-0.49)  
EARLY_INTERIM   -1.380**  
   (-2.44)  
OVERI*EARLY_INTERIM   0.876  
   (0.79)  
EARLY_HIGHABILITY    -0.022 
    (-0.03) 
OVERI*EARLY_HIGHABILITY    1.029 
    (0.73) 
EARLY_LOWABILITY    -1.515** 
    (-2.32) 
OVERI*EARLY_LOWABILITY    0.554 
    (0.47) 
OVERI 4.588*** 4.885*** 4.365*** 4.275*** 
 (6.27) (6.00) (4.31) (5.64) 
SIZE -0.587*** -0.454*** -0.744*** -0.676*** 
 (-5.61) (-3.80) (-5.25) (-6.08) 
MTOB 1.722*** 1.640*** 1.391*** 1.688*** 
 (11.65) (10.02) (6.59) (11.31) 
LOSS -1.735*** -1.718*** -1.647*** -1.882*** 
 (-6.98) (-6.23) (-4.67) (-7.40) 
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Table 2 (Continued)     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 INVT_TOT INVT_TOT INVT_TOT INVT_TOT 
SALE_VOL -2.302** -2.919*** -0.110 -2.669*** 
 (-2.49) (-2.74) (-0.09) (-2.77) 
INVT_VOL 14.788*** 17.134*** 14.048*** 14.210*** 
 (7.90) (8.21) (5.53) (7.45) 
CFO_SALE 4.895*** 4.617** 9.496*** 5.277*** 
 (2.75) (2.16) (3.93) (2.94) 
CFO_VOL 12.558*** 15.055*** 11.359* 11.986*** 
 (2.86) (3.04) (1.78) (2.78) 
SLACK 0.083 0.098 0.174* 0.102 
 (1.33) (1.18) (1.77) (1.59) 
DIV -1.970*** -1.991*** -1.689*** -1.848*** 
 (-6.82) (-5.99) (-4.15) (-6.51) 
ZSCORE 0.210 0.278 0.225 0.133 
 (0.84) (1.00) (0.66) (0.52) 
TANGIBILITY 9.886*** 10.758*** 9.546*** 9.919*** 
 (10.57) (9.78) (7.04) (10.44) 
IND_STRUCTURE -5.145*** -5.497*** -4.869*** -4.976*** 
 (-4.34) (-4.13) (-3.09) (-4.08) 
AQ -0.002 -0.007 -0.020 -0.013 
 (-0.12) (-0.28) (-0.80) (-0.64) 
EINDEX 0.257*** 0.243** 0.095 0.238** 
 (2.72) (2.33) (0.74) (2.37) 
CEOAGE -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.088*** -0.076*** 
 (-4.84) (-3.92) (-4.32) (-5.01) 
CONSTANT 10.941*** 9.268*** 12.769*** 12.772*** 
 (7.23) (5.35) (6.28) (8.09) 
     
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
N 21,012 16,026 12,255 18,911 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207 0.216 0.209 0.204 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Analyses contingent on information environment  
  
Information 
quality 
Information 
asymmetry  
Credit 
rating  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 INVT_TOT INVT_TOT INVT_TOT 
EARLY_YEARS_HIGHAQ -0.806   
 (-1.55)   
OVERI*EARLY_YEAR_HIGHAQ 0.245   
 (0.22)   
EARLY_YEARS_LOWAQ -1.261*   
 (-1.79)   
OVERI*EARLY_YEAR_LOWAQ 1.525   
 (1.24)   
EARLY_YEARS_HIGHIA  -1.679***  
  (-2.59)  
OVERI*EARLY_YEARS_HIGHIA  1.318  
  (1.14)  
EARLY_YEARS_LOWIA  -1.181  
  (-1.63)  
OVERI*EARLY_YEARS_LOWIA  2.382  
  (1.54)  
EARLY_YEARS_NCR   -1.424** 
   (-2.53) 
OVERI*EARLY_YEARS_NCR   1.393 
   (1.40) 
EARLY_YEARS_CR   -0.577 
   (-0.91) 
OVERI*EARLY_YEARS_CR   0.718 
   (0.48) 
OVERI 4.608*** 4.597*** 4.551*** 
 (6.29) (5.75) (6.22) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included Included 
CONSTANT 10.954*** 11.595*** 11.067*** 
 (7.25) (6.75) (7.28) 
    
Year FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Observations 21,012 17,420 21,012 
Adjusted R-squared 0.207 0.196 0.207 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4     
Early years of CEO tenure and future debt and equity issuance  
Panel A     
 
(1) 
Future_debt_ 
issuance 
(2) 
Future_equity_ 
issuance 
(3) 
Future_debt_ 
issuance 
(4) 
Future_equity_ 
issuance 
  
         
EARLY_YEARS -0.016** 0.002     
 (-2.46) (0.57)     
EARLY_YEARS*OVERI 0.013 -0.008     
 (1.10) (-1.15)     
EARLY_EXTERNAL   -0.050** 0.005   
   (-2.51) (0.44)   
OVERI*EARLY_EXTERNAL   0.061** -0.008   
   (1.98) (-0.39)   
EARLY_INTERNAL   -0.009 0.004   
   (-1.19) (0.90)   
OVERI*EARLY_INTERNAL   -0.006 -0.014   
   (-0.44) (-1.50)   
OVERI 0.009 -0.031*** 0.012 -0.035***   
 (1.07) (-5.14) (1.28) (-5.16)   
CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included Included Included   
CONSTANT -0.016** 0.057*** 0.035* 0.047***   
 (-2.46) (3.63) (1.69) (2.85)   
       
Year FE YES YES YES YES   
Industry FE YES YES YES YES   
Observations 17,419 17,419 13,265 13,265   
Adjusted R-squared 0.048 0.194 0.047 0.206   
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Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel B     
 
(1) 
Future_debt_ 
issuance 
(2) 
Future_equity_ 
issuance 
(3) 
Future_debt_ 
issuance 
(4) 
Future_equity_ 
issuance 
  
         
EARLY_PERMANENT  0.011 0.007     
 (0.83) (1.09)     
OVERI*EARLY_PERMANENT -0.002 -0.004     
 (-0.08) (-0.34)     
EARLY_INTERIM -0.016* -0.004     
 (-1.95) (-0.73)     
OVERI*EARLY_INTERIM 0.006 -0.001     
 (0.42) (-0.08)     
EARLY_HIGHABILITY   -0.004 0.016**   
   (-0.40) (2.49)   
OVERI*EARLY_HIGHABILITY   0.005 -0.037***   
   (0.28) (-3.09)   
EARLY_LOWABILITY   -0.018* 0.001   
   (-1.92) (0.13)   
OVERI*EARLY_LOWABILITY   0.010 0.002   
   (0.67) (0.16)   
OVERI 0.013 -0.038*** 0.011 -0.030***   
 (1.04) (-4.43) (1.17) (-4.89)   
CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included Included Included   
CONSTANT 0.059*** 0.053** 0.060*** 0.066***   
 (2.68) (2.51) (3.16) (4.44)   
       
Year FE YES YES YES YES   
Industry FE YES YES YES YES   
Observations 10,636 10,636 15,801 15,801   
Adjusted R-squared 0.052 0.222 0.042 0.189   
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Robustness tests 
Panel A: Specific types of investments   
 
(1) 
CAPX 
(2) 
Non-CAPX 
      
EARLY_YEARS -0.434*** -0.688* 
 (-2.67) (-1.77) 
EARLY_YEARS*OVERI 0.194 0.857 
 (0.70) (1.09) 
OVERI 0.665** 3.159*** 
 (2.09) (5.18) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included 
CONSTANT 1.854*** 10.418*** 
 (2.62) (8.29) 
   
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Observations 21,012 21,012 
Adjusted R-squared 0.530 0.212 
 
Panel B: Using alternative measures of OVERI 
  (1) (2) 
 INVT_TOT INVT_TOT 
   
EARLY_YEARS -0.815** -0.863* 
 (-1.99) (-1.80) 
EARLY_YEARS*OVERINDUSTRY 0.456  
 (0.62)  
OVERINDUSTRY 4.276***  
 (7.60)  
EARLY_YEARS*OVERAGGREGATE 0.856 
  (0.88) 
OVERAGGREGATE  -4.204 
  (-0.56) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Included  Included 
CONSTANT 12.812*** 17.850*** 
 (8.76) (6.65) 
   
Year FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Observations 20,679 21,012 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206 0.143 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Controlling for last years of tenure 
 
(1) 
INVT_TOT 
    
EARLY_YEARS -1.184*** 
 (-2.65) 
EARLY_YEARS*OVERI 1.144 
 (1.32) 
LAST_YEARS -0.960** 
 (-2.36) 
LAST_YEARS*OVERI 0.398 
 (0.51) 
OVERI 4.400*** 
 (5.48) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Included 
CONSTANT 10.679*** 
 (7.00) 
  
Year FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Observations 21,012 
Adjusted R-squared 0.208 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
